With the growth of mobile devices and applications, the number of malicious software, or malware, is rapidly increasing in recent years, which calls for the development of advanced and effective malware detection approaches. Traditional methods such as signature based ones cannot defend users from an increasing number of new types of malware or rapid malware behavior changes. In this paper, we propose a new Android malware detection approach based on deep learning and static analysis. Instead of using Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) only, we further analyze the source code of Android applications and create their higher-level graphical semantics, which makes it harder for attackers to evade detection. In particular, we use a call graph from method invocations in an Android application to represent the application, and further analyze method attributes to form a structured Program Representation Graph (PRG) with node attributes. Then, we use a graph convolutional network (GCN) to yield a graph representation of the application by embedding the entire graph into a dense vector, and classify whether it is a malware or not. To efficiently train such a graph convolutional network, we propose a batch training scheme that allows multiple heterogeneous graphs to be input as a batch. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to use graph representation learning for malware detection. We conduct extensive experiments from real-world sample collections and demonstrate that our developed system outperforms multiple other existing malware detection techniques.
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the rapid growth of smart phone usage in daily life, e.g., for online shopping, online banking, entertainment, and even for remote control. As the major operating system for smart phones, Android is now powering tablets, TVs, wearable devices and even embedded systems in cars and IoT devices. The large market share of Android and its open sourced development ecosystem has not only brought about opportunities for Android Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). , , © 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). ACM ISBN 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM. https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn applications, but also posed challenges to defending attacks from a proliferation of malware (short for malicious software). Due to a lack of trustworthy review methods, it is possible that some developers may upload their Android apps with malicious components, which can be found in a number of third-party Android markets, and even in Google's official Android market, Google Play. According to a report [22] , the quantity of mobile malware detected in 2016 was about 18.4 million, representing an increase of 105% from that in 2015.
To protect users from malware threats, a number of anti-malware solution providers (e.g., Norton, MacAfee, Symamtec, Kingsoft) provide software products as a major means of defence. Their products typically use the signature-based method to detect threats. In this method, a unique signature is generated from a known type of malware, such that malware detection is to match a suspicious app with existing signatures in the maintained database. However, the attackers can easily evade detection, for example, by changing signatures using code obfuscation or repackaging. To overcome these limitations of the signature-based method, the heuristic-based method was introduced in the late 1990s, which operates based on explicit rules crafted by security analyst experts. However, such rules are prone to biases of human expertise; it is also hard to generate rules to match the speed of malware creation.
To overcome these challenges, there is an emerging trend of developing automatic malware detection methods using machine learning. These techniques are capable of classifying previously unseen malware samples as well as identifying the malware families of malicious samples. In these systems, detection has two phases: feature extraction and classification. In the first phase, various features such as API calls, binary strings, are extracted from the original file samples. In the second phase, machine learning is used to automatically categorize the file samples into several classes based on feature representation. Different machine-learning-based malware detection methods differ in both phases.
In this paper, instead of only using API calls as features, we further analyze the control flow graphs (CFGs) that represent the control flows of Android applications. CFGs are widely used in software analysis and have been widely studied in the literature, since it not only provides information of API calls, but also reveals how these API calls interact in the application. Since some APIs are more security sensitive than others, we further extract features for all APIs, such as requested permissions or hardware resources, and represent each Android application as a graph with node attributes.
To make classification decisions from such graph structures, we use graph convolutional neural networks (GCNs), a generalization of classical CNN to handle graph structures. Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have proven to be successful on a wide range of machine learning problems, including image classification, object detection, and deep reinforcement learning. However, in these problems, data can be represented on a regular grid, e.g., pixels in digital images and states of game in Go are grids with fixed numbers of rows or columns. To overcome the challenges of representing graph structures for classification, we use GCNs to embed the derived control flow graphs as points in a vector space for graph classification. Since the input graphs vary in shapes and structures, it is challenging to learn and train GCNs on arbitrary graphs. We propose a batch training algorithm to overcome this issue.
Our contribution in this paper is summarized as follows:
• Novel feature representation: instead of using APIs or binary OpCode (operation code) only, we extract control flow graphs (CFGs) for all Android applications at question, and further analyze their API security sensitive attributes, including requested permissions and hardware resources. Based on these features, we represent each Android application as a graph with node attributes, where a graph convolutional network is subsequently used to classify and detect malware.
• Graph convolutional network with global context: Traditional GCNs only consider information from graph and node attributes. However, in Android malware detection, a wide range of contextual information can also be utilized. In this paper, we use various diverse information from manifest files, which are included in all Android applications, as the global contextual information, and extend the traditional GCNs to take these additional global features into account.
• Batch training for GCNs: A graph classifier is hard to train, since input graphs can have arbitrary sizes and structures. Unlike images, it is unreasonable to resize all input graphs into a fixed shape. As the compatibility with diverse topologies is necessary for convolutional operations on graphs, we propose a batch training algorithm to solve this issue.
BACKGROUND AND SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we introduce preliminaries of the Android operation system, which are crucial for further data preprocessing and designing machine learning algorithms. Then, we will introduce how we design an end-to-end Android malware detection system from large-scale representation learning.
Preliminaries
We firstly introduce some background of Android system and the components in Android application files (known as apk files). The application in Android system are written in Java and executed within a custom Java virtual machine, and each application package is contained in a jar file with the extension of apk. Each Android application consists of many components of different types. These components are the essential building blocks of an Android application. Each component is an entry point through which the system or a user can enter your application and applications interact via components. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the component API for security concerns. There are four different types of app components:
• Activities are the entry points for interacting with the user. Activities handles events triggered by users and provide how users navigate within and between apps.
• Services are general-purpose entry point for keeping an application running in the background for all kinds of reasons. For example, the user might listen to music, which is running in the background service, and use another application. In addition, components can be bounded to services to interact with them, and even perform inter-process communication (IPC).
• Broadcast receivers are components that enable the system to deliver events to the application outside of a regular user flow, allowing the application to respond to system-wide broadcast announcements. As broadcast receivers are also well-defined entry points, the system can deliver broadcasts event to apps that are currently not running. Mostly, they are originated from the system, and some are initiated from apps that usually used to notify other apps.
• Content providers are components managing a shared set of application data that you can store in the file system, in a SQLite database, on the web, or on any other persistent storage location that your application can access. If the content provider allows, other apps can query or modify the data.
All components must be declared in the application manifest file before it can actually be used. Communications between different components are through intents and intent filters. Intents are messaging objects that can be used to request actions from other application components. An intent-filter is an expression declared in the application manifest file that specifies the intent type that the component will receive.
System overview
An overview of our proposed malware detection system is shown in Fig. 1 , which mainly consists of four components: unpacking, static analysis, feature extraction, and classification.
2.2.1 Unpacking and Decompiling. We firstly take a look at what is inside the apk file. Each apk file is actually a zipped file that includes the application code, resources, assets, and manifest file. The manifest file plays the central role in Android apps. In this file, it contains various of important and security sensitive information, including components, permissions, hardware features, .etc. In fact, the Android system requires all apps to declare these information in their manifest files; otherwise, they are not recognized by the system and will be ignored.
The manifest file is not sufficient to provide the whole picture of an app. In addition to this, sources codes are our next and the major part to extract features. The original source codes included in apk files are dex codes, i.e., Dalvik executable files, that can be interpreted by the Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM). Unfortunately, the dex file is hard to understand and we need to convert it into human-readable format as smali code, which is the intermediate code and can be obtained by disassembling from the dex file. Fortunately, the nature of DVM provides tools for such decompiling purpose. In particular, we use APKTool [5] to unpack the apk file and decompile the dex files to smali codes. The major feature to represent an Android application is its call graph, which represents calling relationships between methods. In this graph, each node represents a method and each edge, for example (f , д), denotes a method invocation that method f calls method д. If there is a recursive call, meaning a method f calls itself, a cycle will be used. Call graph is a good visualization of internal structure of any kinds of computer programs and has been widely used in many fields. An example of a call graph is shown in Fig. 2 . In this call graph there are five methods and four invocations. Each node in the call graph is assigned with a unique ID, which consists of class name, method name, function arguments type and return type. Call relations are represented as directed edges, for example the directed edge from com.fa.c.RootCommand: Execute() to android.util.Log: d() indicates that there is a invocation statement for android.util.Log: d() inside com.fa.c.RootCommand: Execute() method. However we can not affirm this invocation will be executed when the APP is running com.fa.c.RootCommand: Execute(), cause programmer can also set constrains for this invocation. We will ignore those constrain for our call graph and try to conclude as many invocations as possible.
Node Feature Extraction.
After construction of call graph, the whole program is then represented by how methods invocate each other, and each method is now represented by a node. In this step, we further extract secure sensitive properties of each method that act as node attributes of our constructed call graph. In other words, our goal is to construct a graph with node attributes. In particular, we extract the following five types of attributes for each method:
• Method type: We categorize all methods into four types:
Android system API, third-party API, component methods and others. Android system API includes all APIs listed in the Android official references, and libraries provided by Java. 
Classification.
The outcome of previous steps is a graph with node attributes. With proper transformation, we can apply grpah convolutional networks (GCN) for malware detection. Traditional methods involve hand-craft feature extraction on the top of such graph structured data in order to measure the neighborhood of two nodes in the graph. In this paper, however, we turn to apply graph convolutional networks that are capable of end-to-end training. In this approach, a graph will be embedded as a point in a vector space, and classification can be done on such vector space. A key benefit of this approach is that learning the mapping of embedding and the classification scheme can be done jointly.
Additional details
In the last part of this section, we put some details of our proposed system. We start from construction of call graphs. For many reasons, generating a precise call graph is challenging for reason as follows.
(1) When a calling statement is found, the binding between two methods may be resolved at compilation time or runtime. An example is when a method is inherited from its parent class. (2) Unlike Java programs, Android applications do not have a main method but multiple entry points instead. These entry points are implicitly called by the Android framework in the back end. (3) Callbacks are prevalent in Android applications. There are some existing work like FlowDroid [7] to solve these issues. However, we found that these tools are quite complicated and time consuming with limited benefits for malware detection. Therefore, we use a simple yet effective call graph construction way by adding an additional dummyMain node that connects to all methods listed in smali codes.
Once the call graph is constructed, we need to extract features for all nodes, including the dummyMain node. As discussed above, each node contains four kinds of attributes, including method types, permissions, and hardware features. Permissions are definitely most security sensitive attributes; in fact, many operations need specific permissions to execute and these permissions are granted by user at installation, and malware samples are prone to request a special set of permissions. We actually have two types of permissions from manifest file, namely, requested permissions and component permissions. As the dummyMain node connects to all methods in this apk file, we assign requested permissions as its attribute, and assign component permissions to corresponding methods in the component.
Other attributes are also crucial for malware detection. For example, we also collect all intent filters since they can be used for eavesdropping specific intents. Malware samples are sensitive to a special set of system events, so intent filters can be hints.
Note that we should be aware of a special set of APIs that can lead to malicious behaviors without requesting permissions. For example, cryptography functions in the Java library are considered as some math functions so no permissions needed. However, these functions can be used by malware samples for code obfuscation purpose, so unusual usage of these functions should be paid attention to. We will mark these type of functions as suspicious APIs, like what [6] did.
Finally, we introduce how we extract these features by static analysis. Most of these node attributes can be extracted from manifest file, for example, intent filters. Requested permissions can be found in the tag uses-permissions and component permission can be found as an attribute android:permission. In our system, we use some offline tools to obtain system API permission mapping, including official references [3] and using PSCout [8] , then assign component permissions to corresponding methods, and finally assign all permissions shown in uses-permissions to the dummyMain node. Note that we only gather permissions or hardware features that a method requests, no matter where to collect them. A tricky thing is about hardware features. In Android, the tag uses-feature is used to declare hardware or software features. Sometimes we may not find any hardware features in manifest file, since they are implicitly declared by permissions. A common practice is to use a tool aapt from Android SDK to determine what hardware features are declared.
A GRAPH APPROACH FOR MALWARE DETECTION
In this section, we exploit the graph representation of Android malware samples provided by control flow graph, and propose the Call Graph based Graph Convolutional Network (CG-GCN) for malware detection. We illustrate the overall architecture of our proposed model in Fig. 3 . We firstly formulate the malware detection problem as a classification problem. Then we apply graph convolutional network (GCN) to solve it. To speed up training, we further propose a batch training scheme that allows to simultaneously learn graph representation vectors in a batch.
Feature Transformation and Graph Representation Learning
So far, we obtain a number of call graphs as well their corresponding node attributes. Recall that the nodes in a call graph are actually methods, and each method may have certain permission to request, or hardware resources to use, .etc. Each node is associated with a set of such attributes and the empty set is also allowed here. We now formulate the above idea as follows. A call graph is denoted by G = (V , E), and we use A to denote its adjacent matrix. For each node v ∈ V , it is associated with a set F v that extracted from the previous stage, and the goal of feature transformation is to find a proper function ϕ(·) such that it can convert the node attribute set F v into a vector x v ∈ R h 0 , where h 0 is the dimension of the destination vector space. By doing so, we can have a new matrix X such that the v-th row is x v , and the role of graph convolutional network (GCN) is to classify the input tuple (A, X ) into categories malicious or benign.
Traditional approaches often involve carefully feature engineering techniques to design ϕ and measure local neighborhood structures from A, and then we can use existing machine learning algorithms for non-structural data. However, these hand-craft approaches are inflexible and limited under the rapid changing trend of Android malware samples. In fact, as we will see in Sec. 4, the call graph structure can vary a lot, both in scale and in complexity, and designing these features can be time-consuming. Recently, a surge of new approaches attempt to learn representation of the graph by learning a mapping that embeds nodes or entire (sub)graphs as points in a vector space, which is usually in lowdimension. A good mapping should reflect the graph structure from geometric relationships among learned vectors in this space, which is called embeddings and can be used for further machine learning tasks as feature inputs. In these approaches, representations of nodes and the whole graph (or subgraph) are no longer designed from kernel functions or other carefully engineered schemes; instead, we design algorithms that can automatically learn them.
In this spirit, a good feature transformation should keep as much raw information as possible. Therefore, we consider onehot encoding scheme to convert sets into vectors. Specifically, we denote S as the set of all possible values in F v , and we have S = {s 1 , . . . , s |S | }. Then, we assign a vector x v ∈ R |S | such that the i-th entry x v (i) = 1, if s i is shown in F v , and x v (i) = 0 vice versa. Fig. 4 illustrates details of one-hot encoding that used in our system. Here we use different color blocks to represent different permissions. In this example, node A requests three permissions, and node B also requests three permissions. The block with color will be encoded as 1 and the white block will be encoded as 0. Obviously, such one-hot encoding scheme results in sparse node features.
Once we have the tuple (A, X ) on hand, the next task is to learn representations of graph G that embeds G into a low-dimensional vector space. More formally, the goal is to find z G ∈ R d for all G given its adjacent matrix A and node feature matrix X , and z G will be used for further classification. This is the role for GCN.
Deep Graph Convolutional Networks for Malware Detection
Unlike conventional network representation learning algorithms, which attempts to learn node representations in unsupervised learning settings, learning the graph representation z G is quite challenging and often should involve supervised learning setting. In the subsequent of this section, we will see how our proposed model CG-GCN can be utilized for graph classification while learns lowdimensional vectors for all graphs. The basic idea in graph neural networks is to generate node embedding vector by iteratively aggregating vectors from its neighbor nodes. The operations at each layer is illustrated in Fig. 5 . In each layer, node v is associated with a hidden vector h v and let h 0 v = x v at the beginning. At layer k, the hidden vector of node v aggregates hidden vectors from its neighbors as follows:
where N (v) denotes the set of neighbors of node v, σ denotes the activation function at layer k, and W k is the weight matrix with size
Here we denote d k as the dimension of hidden vectors at layer k. By iteratively performing the above equation for all nodes at all layers, we can finally obtain node embedding vectors at the last layer K for all nodes. These final representation vectors are regarded as the embedding vectors: for node v, its embedding vector is defined as z v := h K v .
Figure 5: Aggregation of Graph Convolution Network
Similar to X , we can juxtaposition all node embedding vectors as a embedding matrix Z . As each node aggregates from its neighbors, it also implies that the node features are propagating to further nodes in the graph in deeper layers, and the formation of Z implicitly depicts local neighborhood structure. After obtaining node embeddings Z , we sum all the individual node embeddings in the graph to form the representation vector z G :
As discussed in previous section, we have some special information that encoded as node feature of dummyMain node, including permission requests and hardware requests. These features provide a global context for other methods to learn node embedding vectors. For malware detection purpose, however, they are also important features to discriminate whether this app is malicious. For this reason, we create a shortcut from the node feature for dummyMain node to the last layer and the input vector for classification is actually the concatenation vector of graph embedding vector and the node feature vector for the dummyMain node. More formally, we denote x G as the row vector of the dummyMain node in X , and the vector for graph classification is actually [z G , x G ], where [] denotes the concatenation operator.
A deep GCN model is well suited for our malware detection problem for following reasons. First, it enables us to capture structural information. A full malicious behavior in an app often reflects a long trait on the call graph. For example, when eavesdropping messages in a smartphone, a malware should firstly execute the API that can read messages, and then send it out. In call graph, this simple action refers two sites: a source site that gets user's message, and a sink site that sends message out. Consider individual API calls is not enough to analyze such malicious behaviors. Also, we can obtain a graph embedding as well as node embedding using GCN. This means, we can simultaneously have representations for both methods and the entire app, which encodes structural information for both.
Batch Training GCN
Now we turn to introduce how we train GCN and propose our batch training approach to speed it up. Suppose we have a training set D := {(A i , X i , y i )} of n graphs, where (A i , X i ) denotes the input tuple (A, X ) for the i-th graph in D. The GCN takes (A i , X i ) as input and we can obtain [z i , x i ] as the vector for graph classification. By adopt the sigmoid loss, we obtain the optimization for embedding parameters and discriminative classifier estimation as
where u is the weight parameter for classification and {W} is the collection of weight parameters for GCN. Here we use [z i , x i ] as the concatenation of graph representation vector z i for the i-th input graph ands x i is the node feature of dummyMain node in the same graph. We can also add regularizer term in (4) to prevent from overfitting. One of the greatest challenges for conducting convolution on graph-structured data is the difficulty of training graphs in a batch [18] . Due to the irregular structure and shapes, some existing techniques in conventional CNN, like resizing or reshaping, are not suitable for GCN, which weakens the compatibility of GCN. Here we propose our approach for training GCN in batch mode.
Here we denote H k as the matrix of hidden vectors whose v-th row is the hidden vector for node v. From graph theory we can
since A only accounts for links with neighbor nodes. DenoteÂ := A + I , and letD as the diagonal node degree matrix ofÂ that are used for normalization. Then, we can combine (1) and (2) as follows [17] :
We denoteÃ =D − 1 2ÂD − 1 2 which is invariant to all layers. Therefore, we can simply precomputeÃ before passing it into the neural network, and at layer k we have:
In summary, the sequential training is firstly computeÃ i for the i-th sample. Then, let it passes the GCN and we will get [z i , x i ] at the final representations. By calculating the loss on this individual sample, we can have its derivatives and in turn updates weights using stochastic gradient descent (SGD) or its variant optimizers. Now let us extend the above idea from single sample training to batch training. Suppose we want to train m samples as a minibatch, denoted as (A 1 , X 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (A m , X m , y m ). Similarly, we can precomputeÃ i for all samples in this minibatch. As graphs can have various number of nodes, we try to concatenate all A i the minibatch as follows:
So now we can use the following way to calculate a minibatch of graphs simultaneously:
. .
If we denoteĤ k −1 as the concatenation matrix of all H k −1 i , for i = 1, . . . , m, updatingH k can be simply written as simple aŝ
which is now similar to the sequential case. By iteratively performing the above equation, we can obtain node embeddings for all nodes in all input graphs, and further obtain graph embeddings.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed CG-GCN model on the Android malware detectoin task. We will first introduce the dataset of malware samples and clean files for this task. After that, to evaluate our modelâĂŹs efficiency, we will compare our model with a wide variety of existing machine-learning based malware detection approaches as well as some commercial anti-virus engines. Finally, we qualitatively evaluate the final representations learned from our proposed CG-GCN model.
Experiment Setup
In this paper, we evaluate our algorithm on DREBIN dataset [6] that contains 5, 560 malware files collected from August 2010 to October 2012. All malware samples are labeled by one of 179 malware families. Along with these malware datasets, we also collect a number of real-world Android applications collected from the Internet. Resources of these files include Apkpure [4] with 5400 samples, 700 samples from 360.com and over 13, 000 commercial applications from the HKUST Wake Lock Misuse Detection Project [19] . In summary, we have collected 19, 100 real-world applications. Although these Android applications are mostly collected from well-known Android markets and research projects, we should ensure whether they are clean. To do so, we uploaded all these collected files to the VirusTotal service, a public anti-virus service with 78 popular engines, and inspected scanning reports from the VirusTotal service for each file. Each engine in VirusTotal would show one of three detection results: True for "malicious", False for "clean", and NK for "not known", respectively. If an application has more than one True result, we label it as malware; otherwise, we label it as clean. As a result, only 16, 753 out of 19K collected samples passed all scanners on the VirusTotal service, and we take 5, 877 samples from them as clean files for evaluation in this paper. Table 2 shows some statistics of the DREBIN Android malware dataset and the dataset of clean files. A key observation is the highly skewness of node and edge distributions among Android apk files. Due to the highly diversity of Android application developers, the size can range from KB to GB on the Internet. In the dataset we use for our evaluation, the largest file in the DREBIN dataset is 29MB and in clean files is 62 MB. Such diversity will bring sever challenges in training and learning GCN. Table 4 shows the number of extracted features in Sec. 2. As hardware resources are restricted by devices and Android system, its value set is quite small. Mostly used permissions are provided by Android system as well, therefore it is expected to have many overlap of permissions among apps. However, intent filters can be easily created by users and developers, it has the most variety and sparsity.
All experiments were conducted on a Compute Engine on Google Cloud with 4 cores and 16 GB RAM running Ubuntu 16.04. This engine is also equipped with an NVidia Tesla P100 GPU to speed up graph convolutional network, which is implemented on top of TensorFlow [2] . We evaluate the Android malware detection performance of different methods using the measures shown in Table 1 . One thing need to be noticed is that in security precision and false positive rate are two most important evaluations for security system.
Performance Evaluation on Benchmark Dataset
In this experiment, we randomly select 80% of the data for training, and the rest 20% for testing. During training stage, all training samples will be used to do 4-fold cross validation to train our model as well as tune the hyperparameters, and the testing samples are only be used for performance evaluation at the testing stage. We repeat this procedure for 5 times and average results. All baseline # of malicious apps correctly detected T N # of benign apps correctly classified F P # of false prediction as malicious F N # of false prediction as clean
Error rate, which is 1 − ACC. F PR False positive rate, F P/(T N + F P) DF Detection failure rate, F N /(T P + F N ) methods as well as our proposed one are conducted in the same procedure. To evaluate our model, we firstly compare it with various machinelearning based malware detection algorithms. In particular, we compare the performance against the ones using static analysis without graph structure. For those baseline algorithms, we extract features from static analysis of both manifest and source codes, which is similar to Arp et al. [6] for all samples, except that we do not extract network addresses here. All features were encoded in one-hot fashion as shown in Fig. 4 .
We compare with four other typical classification methods on these features, they are Random Forest (RF), Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Naive Bayes (NB) with three kernels of variants: Gaussian (NB-G), Bernoulli (NB-B) and Multinomial (NB-M). For RF, we set the maximum dept as 6 to trade off time and performance. For SVM, which is also the classifier used in [6] , we use LibSVM in our experiment and the penalty is set to 2.
The results of this experiment are shown in Table 4 . In this table, "GCN" refers to the algorithms without concatenating the feature vector x, and "GCN+" refers to the one we introduced in Sec. 3 . From this table, we can clearly observe that our proposed GCN significantly outperforms the other approaches by nearly 2.94% of precision in prediction. All the baseline algorithms have also achieved good performance, most of them have a precision above 90%. However, without modeling the semantics between API nodes these algorithms will never get a comparable performance to our GCN approach. This would even become more obvious when the malware become more complicate.
The most significant improvement of GCN is the false positive rate, Table 4 shows that our proposed method drops the false positive rate from 5% to 0.09%, corresponding to nearly 100 fewer false alarms during evaluating 2346 samples, which is remarkable cause false alarms have always be a big concern in security and would cost considerable time and energy for system user to get rid of it. Although Naive Bayes with Bernoulli kernel provides the highest detection rate of 99.91% and best detection failure rate of 0.09%, such rate is at the expense of high false positive rate (10.12%), which diminishes its effectiveness and overall performance. Note that in this table, GCN+ outperforms GCN, which indicates that we can enhance detection performance by incorporating global contextual information.
This can be attributed to the two characteristics of our model. First, the input of Android apk files are transformed into call graphs, which provides a more detailed picture of Android applications like data flow. In contrast, traditional machine learning based malware detection algorithm only accounts for static features. Second, some features are more expressive in our model. We can consider permissions as an example. A malware sample may declare more permissions than necessary in order to use remote server to control a device. Traditional methods only scans the permissions that are actually used, while our model can explicitly learn the "permission distribution" in call graphs. When permissions are requested by isolated methods, which are often executed by command & control servers, such apk file is more likely to be malware samples. Such information can only be exploited by learning from structural data as our model does, of which traditional models are lack.
Note that the thresholds of prediction malicious or benign applications in Table 4 are all set as 0.5. To further investigate detection performance under different threshold, we plot the receiver operating characteristic curves (ROC curves) in Fig. 6 . From Fig. 6 , we can see that given a certain false positive level, our detection rate is always higher than other methods in almost all region, which is a significant improvement and means that we can get very high malware detection rate and give little false alarms at the same time. We also notice that the performance given by the classical "flat features + SVM" model is relatively not bad. Actually this is reasonable, as the features are carefully extracted. However, our model provides a method to detect Android malware without manually designed features: we only need to construct a call graph and the method specifications like permissions and hardware resources. We can also easily incorporate handcrafted features into our model for specific purpose by concatenating them with our embedded vector at the last layer.
Compare with AV engines
We also compared the performance of our malware detection algorithm with existing Anti-Virus engines on VirusTotal [1]. The critical point to mention is that all of the 'truly' clean files used in our experiments are actually labeled by these AV engines using the rule described in subsection 4.1. Therefore, AV engines are supposed to have a better false positive rate than their normal performance. Another thing is, even though we got the scan results of all 78 AV engines from VirusTotal, here we just list the ones with the best performance or ones that are already popular and widely used in security programs such as, Kaspersky, Cylance and McAfee. Table 5 lists parts of the AV engines' scanning results on the testing split of our experiment dataset. Comparing to the result of our GCN method we can see that our method outperforms most of the AV engines, with a precision of 99.91% and FPR of 0.06%. For false positive rate, our method outperforms 7 out of 10 antivirus engines, which is remarkable cause all the engines would have better FPR on this dataset. And for most of the antivirus engines that have a better recall or F 1 score than what our method provided would often end up with either much worse precision or higher FPR, e.g. AV5, AV7 and AV10. Only several engines have a comparable overall results, e.g. AV4 and AV2.
Qualitative evaluation of interpretable representations
A core problem of machine learning is to interpret the trained model. To qualitatively assess how much interpretable our model has, we randomly chose 2, 000 samples in our dataset, in which we have 1, 000 malware samples and 1, 000 clean samples. We firstly generate t-SNE plots [20] of all samples using feature vectors x G of their dummyMain nodes in Fig. 7(a) . From this figure, we can clearly see clusters of clean samples and malware samples, which implies that the features we have extracted are highly relevant of detecting malware. However, the boundary is not separable. A number of points on the right half plane are entangled a lot, and any simple hyperplane or curves on this would fail to classify these points. This helps explain why using flat features for traditional machine learning algorithms are hard to improve performance. By further exploiting graph structure from call graphs, our proposed CG-GCN model can simultaneously learn classification and graph representation. We generate t-SNE plots for all samples using their embedding vectors z G in Fig. 7(b) . At this time, malware points and clean points are separable by a significant margin. An interesting finding is that clean points are clustered at the top, while malware points are forming several small spirals that disconnected with each other. This implies that the rich semantics encoded in call graph and node features can bring more information for malware detection.
RELATED WORK
In order to keep combating the increasing number of malicious applications, there have been a number of research studies on developing Android malware detection system using machine learning and data mining, e.g., [6, 11, 15, 24, 25] . The major difference among them is on how to extract features from packed applications. One category is to use dynamic analysis to capture API calls or environmental variables during execution and obtain the original codes from packed Android applications. For example, DroidDophin [25] use DroidBox and APE to record thirteen activity features. Another example is CopperDroid [23] , which is a Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) based dynamic analysis system that extract operating system interactions and process communications as features, in which both intra-process and inter-process are considered. However, the coverage of dynamic analysis is limited since not all malicious behaviors can appear in only one execution, so dynamic analysis usually takes long time.
In contrast, static analysis focuses on analyzing the internal components of an application, and it is able to explore all possible execution paths in malware samples. For example, DroidMat [24] and DREBIN [6] performed static analysis on manifest file and source codes to extract multiple features including permissions, hardware resources and API calls, where the first uses k-means clustering and k-NN classification and the later uses support vector machine (SVM) to train the one-hot encoded feature vectors for Android malware detection. There are other classifiers in the literature. For example, Peiravian and Zhu [21] consider SVM, decision tree and ensemble classifiers. Different from existing works, we analyze the method invocations to form a call graph and extract attributes for all methods in an application, which provides a more complete picture of the application. Based on these extracted features, the Android apps will be represented by a graph with node features, and a sparse vector consists of global contextual information.
Another trend of static analysis in Android security is to detect some specific malicious behaviors like privacy breach and over privilege. For example, [13, 16] goes through source code with a predefined source and sinks to find a potential private breach. Fu et al. [12] attempts to protect from stealing private information by examining all URL addresses in source codes. However, we note that static taint-analysis and over privilege are prone to be false positive.
To differentiate malicious apps from clean ones, we use graph convolution neural network for machine learning on graph-structured data. Several convolutional neural network architectures have been proposed for learning over graphs in recent years, most of them can be categorized as spectral graph convolutional neural networks. Its seminal work was done by Bruna et. al. [9] and later by Defferrard et. al. [10] with fast localized convolutions. Kipf and Welling [17] propose a first order approximation scheme to reduce the computational costs the graph filter spectrum. One thing interesting of these two works is that although they consider spectral convolution, all convolution operations in their papers are actually done in spatial domain only, which is convenient to implement on various deep learning frameworks. A more recent work by Hamilton et al. [14] further extends GCNs by considering more generic form of aggregation functions and allow nodes to sample their neighborhoods. In our application, we extend these existing works, which are focusing on node embedding, to graph embedding models. Another extension is that we further jointly train the deep GCN model with a wide model for global contextual features. Finally, to efficiently train a large number of graphs with arbitrary shapes, we propose a batch training algorithm to allow multiple graphs as input in a minibatch. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present an Android malware detection framework based on deep graph convolutional networks. Instead of using API calls only, we utilize static analysis to generate call graphs and method attributes to represent Android applications. Such feature representation not only provides higher-level sematics but also includes detailed execution information that makes attackers hard to evade the detection. Based on the extracted features, we present a novel Android malware detection framework based on graph convolutional networks. We extend existing convolutional networks for graph classification and incorporate global contextual information that extract from manifest files. To further enhance training efficiency, we propose a batch training algorithm that enables multiple various shapes of graphs as a input minibatch. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to use GCN for Android malware detection. A comprehensive experimental study on the real sample collections is performed to compare various malware detection approaches, and results reveal that our algorithm outperforms state-of-the-art techniques.
